Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains? An Empirical Analysis of Sub-Tier Supply Network Structure on Firm Performance in the High-Tech Sector by Wang, Yixin (Iris) et al.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
  
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains? An Empirical 
Analysis of Sub-Tier Supply Network Structure on Firm 
Performance in the High-Tech Sector 
 
 
Yixin (Iris) Wang 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
Jun Li 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
Ravi Anupindi 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
Ross School of Business Working Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 1297 
December 2015 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Sciences Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705654 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705654 
Submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
manuscript
Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains? An
Empirical Analysis of Sub-tier Supply Network
Structure on Firm Performance in the High-Tech
Sector
Yixin (Iris) Wang, Jun Li, Ravi Anupindi
Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, {iriswang, junwli, anupindi}@umich.edu
Past research in supply chain risk management has focused on the interactions between buyers and their
immediate suppliers and/or assumed independence of risks imposed by these suppliers. However, supply
network structure may induce inter-dependency of risks due, for example, to overlapping sub-tier suppliers.
This paper empirically studies the prevalence of overlapping sub-tier suppliers and their impact on financial
performance for firms in the high-tech sector. Using firm-level supplier-customer relationship data, we find
that on average 20 (2.3) percent of tier-2 suppliers are shared by at least two (five) tier-1 suppliers. We
also find that the risk, measured as stock return volatility, of the focal tier-0 firm is positively associated
with common tier-2 supplier risk, and the association is stronger for suppliers with a higher degree of tier-
2 commonality. To disentangle the impact of risky supply network structure from risky tier-2 suppliers,
we define two network metrics, viz., diamond ratio and cosine commonality score. We find that a one
standard deviation increase in each of these metric leads to an increase in standard deviation of 0.58 and
0.41 respectively in tier-0 firm’s risk. Our results reveal substantial unmanaged supply chain risks due to
overlapping sub-tier suppliers, and highlight the need for firms to increase visibility into their extended
supply network.
1. Introduction
In the past decade firms have encountered an ever-increasing number of supply chain disruptions,
triggered by a wide range of natural and man-made causes such as earthquake, flood, fire, labor
protest, financial crisis and political unrest. These events have led to substantial short-term (pro-
duction delay, increased labor and supply costs) and long-term (market share erosion, bankruptcy)
losses.
As a consequence, supply chain risk management has become an active area of research. One
stream of research analyzes the role of inventory in protecting firms against supply chain disruptions
(see Parlar and Berkin 1991, Parlar 1997, Qi et al. 2009, for example). Others explore the use
of supplier diversification as a viable strategy to mitigate supply chain risks (see Li et al. 2010,
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Babich et al. 2007, for example). Additionally, scholars have also looked into the benefit of flexibility
(Tang and Tomlin 2008, Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996), vertical integration (Braunscheidel and
Suresh 2009) and the level of trust between supply chain partners (Bode et al. 2011) on firms’
supply chain agility. Sodhi and Chopra (2004) broadly categorize seven types of supply chain risks
and discuss the drivers of each risk category and their mitigation strategies. The majority of this
literature, however, focuses on the risk management of immediate suppliers. Only recently have
scholars begun to investigate the role of sub-tier supply network structure on firms’ risk mitigation
strategies (Ang et al. 2015, Bakshi and Mohan 2015). The Japan tsunami and the Thailand flood
of 2011, considered watershed events, brought into sharp focus opaqueness of the sub-tier structure
and a firm’s exposure to it. In fact such information black holes turned out to be a firm’s Achilles
heel (Brennan 2011):
The shortages of components from our tier one suppliers were bad news. Still, the real nail
biter was the possibility that a raw material deep in the supply chain could be unavailable.
A raw material outage can affect hundreds of supplier parts and thousands of our products. It
was nerve wracking having to wait weeks for news to percolate up from the sub-tiers where
we had so little visibility.
Based on responses from 525 firms in 71 countries spanning 14 different industries, the 2014
Supply Chain Resilience Survey reveals that 51 percent of supply chain disruptions originate from
two or more tiers deep in the supply chain (Business Continuity Institute 2014). The same report
also finds that 13 percent of organizations are unaware of where a disruption originates. The
LexisNexis Group (2013) corroborates this finding, suggesting that almost 40 percent of reported
supply chain disruptions originate from tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers. These findings underscore the
importance of the need to develop sub-tier visibility for a company’s supply chain risk management
agenda. Indeed, Toyota, Cisco, and P&G have initiated significant efforts to identify their sub-tier
suppliers (Sa´enz and Revilla 2013). Putting together such a map, usually with the help of their
tier-1 suppliers, however, is not always an easy undertaking because manufacturers rarely have
direct relationships with their sub-tier suppliers. In fact several manufactures, for example, Toyota,
Boeing and Migros, have reported that their tier-1 suppliers are reluctant or unwilling to disclose
full details regarding their suppliers (Grimm 2013).
Not only is it important to know who the sub-tier suppliers are, the structure of the network
that binds them together could also be important. For example, when many tier-1 suppliers share a
common tier-2 supplier, the supply base has a single-point of failure. But the structure of the sub-
tier supply base appears to be even more of a mystery to many. “We thought our supply chain was
pyramid shaped, but it turned out to be barrel-shaped,” said a Toyota Motor Corporation spokesman
in a Japan Times article (Brennan 2011).
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Uncovering the structure of sub-tier supply chain will be quite effort intensive and worthwhile
only when there are significant benefits for such an undertaking. Our paper represents the first
empirical attempt to study the nature and impact of sub-tier supply network structure on firm
performance. One of the major challenges to study sub-tier suppliers is the lack of relevant data.
Previous empirical studies in supply chain management typically use the sector-level US input-
output table of material flows (e.g., Cachon et al. 2007, Osadchiy et al. 2015). The most commonly
used firm-level supply-customer relationship data source, Compustat, only identifies the immediate
customers who contribute more than 10% of revenues to the focal firm. This dataset cannot reliably
identify suppliers, because major suppliers of small to medium customer firms and international
suppliers are under-represented in the dataset. The recent availability of more complete firm-level
supplier-customer data has enabled supply chain studies at a more granular level. For example, Jain
et al. (2013) use transaction-level Import/Export data to build a one-step relationship between US
and overseas firms. Bellamy et al. (2014) use Connexiti’s supply chain database to examine the
impact of supply network accessibility on firm’s innovation output.
Over the past decade firms have increasingly relied on global suppliers to take advantage of
lower input costs and geographical skill specialization (Hausman et al. 2005). Because Compustat
data largely focuses on domestic relationships, it is not an ideal platform to study global supply
chain relationships. Neither is the US Import/Export data, which contains only one-step cross-
border relationship. We therefore rely on a new data source, Bloomberg, whose new Supply Chain
Function maps 35,000 firms with their suppliers and customers. This data is more comprehensive
than Compustat and US Import/Export. For example, for S&P 500 high-tech firms, the total
number of suppliers, international and domestic, identified by Bloomberg is on average seven times
larger than that identified by Compustat.
Using Bloomberg data, but with a focus on domestic supply networks, Wu and Birge (2014) study
the influence of immediate supplier returns on firm returns across all sectors. In contrast, using
Bloomberg we collect both domestic and international supply chain relationships and characterize
the structure of a multi-tier supply network for high-tech firms worldwide. We choose the high-tech
sector as our test bed because it is among the top few sectors that reportedly face a higher frequency
of supply chain disruptions, and the industry’s hyper-competitive nature and rapid growth rate
imply more severe financial impacts of such disruptions.
Our supply network contains 4,538 firms, including 2,646 high-tech firms, 1,890 non-high-tech
suppliers, and 13,670 directional links. Using this dataset, we study the nature, structure, and
influence of tier-2 supplier commonality on the performance of focal tier-0 firms. There are sev-
eral reasons why we focus on tier-2 supplier commonality. First, it has been the recent focus of
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some of the world’s largest manufacturers. For example, Toyota discovered that many of its tier-
1 suppliers share some of, or even all of, their tier-2 suppliers (Masui and Nishi 2012). Resilinc
(www.resilinc.com), a supply chain risk management company, also finds similar patterns in their
clients’ supply networks spanning multiple industries including high-tech, automotive and chemi-
cals (Resilinc 2013).
Second, Tier-2 supplier commonality results in interdependent risk patterns among tier-1 sup-
pliers, which presents new challenges to the effectiveness of traditional risk mitigation efforts that
treat suppliers as isolated. For example, Ang et al. (2015) conclude that an overlap in the tier-2
supply base is a critical factor that influences a manufacturer’s optimal risk mitigation strategy.
Specifically, they find that when a greater overlap is observed, firms should increasingly rely on
supply chain contracts to induce tier-1 suppliers to mitigate sourcing risks, as opposed to using
direct mitigation strategies such as multi-sourcing or holding excess inventory.
From the perspective of a tier-0 firm, tier-2 supplier commonality gives rise to a network structure
that takes the shape of a diamond (Japan METI 2011). To characterize the diamond shape in supply
networks, we propose several metrics including degree of commonality (unweighted), diamond ratio
(unweighted) and cosine commonality score (weighted by cost-of-goods-sold). Using these metrics,
we document the prevalence of overlapping sub-tier suppliers in the high-tech sector. Specifically,
we find that on average 20 percent of tier-2 suppliers are shared by two or more tier-1 suppliers
and 2.3 percent of tier 2 suppliers are shared by at least five tier-1 suppliers. We then quantify
the impact of the tier-2 supplier commonality on the risk of the tier-0 firm, which is measured as
stock return volatility as in Hendricks and Singhal (2005b). First, we find a positive and significant
association between common tier-2 supplier risk and tier-0 firm risk. This association increases
with the degree of commonality, measured as the number of tier-1 suppliers who share a tier-2
supplier. In particular, when a tier-2 supplier is shared by five or more tier-1 suppliers, one standard
deviation increase in tier-2 supplier risk is associated with 0.79 standard deviation increase in tier-0
firm risk. Second, we separate the impact of risks that originate from the supply network structure
and of those that originate from the suppliers. Using the diamond ratio, an unweighted measure of
tier-2 commonality, and cosine commonality score, a cost-of-goods-sold (COGS) weighted measure,
we quantify the direct impact of the sub-tier network structure on a tier-0 firm’s risk. We find
that, one standard deviation increase in the diamond ratio (cosine commonality score) leads to 0.58
(0.41) standard deviation increase in a tier-0 firm’s risk, while controlling for average tier-1 and
tier-2 supplier risks, market risk, and various firm-specific financial and operational characteristics.
Given that both tier-0 firms and tier-1 suppliers have very limited knowledge of sub-tier network
structure and its impact, they are unlikely to take endogenous actions to hedge against such risk
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coming from shared tier-2s. Consequently, the effect of tier-2 commonality that we measure here
is likely causal and immune to omitted variable biases.
In summary, our results reveal substantial unmanaged supply chain risks due to sub-tier over-
laps and highlight the need for firms to increase visibility into their extended supply network. In
particular, firms should identify critical sub-tier suppliers shared by multiple immediate suppliers
and manage their risks effectively.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Mostly due to lack of relevant supply chain data, empirical research in supply chain risk manage-
ment has been sparse. Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a,b) pioneered this line of research by
using event studies to quantify the negative effect of supply chain disruptions on firm stock price.
They measured change in financial performance using abnormal stock returns and return volatility
around the date when a supply chain disruption was announced to the public. Subsequent studies
extend this line of work to analyze how firm characteristics and actions mitigate the impact of
disruption risks. Hendricks et al. (2009) find that greater operational slack and lower geographic
diversification reduces the impact of disruptions. Schmidt and Raman (2015) find that actions to
improve operational efficiency have different impacts on firms facing distinct types of disruptions.
Note this line of research focuses on publicly announced supply chain disruptions, but not the
source of the disruption, immediate tier vs. sub-tiers, or the embedded network structure that may
facilitate or prevent the propagation of the original event.
In order to link disruptions originating from sub-tier suppliers to the performance of tier-0 firms,
it will be ideal to be able to track supply chain disruptions and in particular, identify their origins.
Collecting a sufficiently large number of supply chain risk events and identifying their nature and
origins is clearly a daunting task and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, using firm-level
data, we link the financial performance, measured by stock return volatility (Hendricks and Singhal
2005b), of sub-tier suppliers and tier-0 firms. Prior work has established the association of firms’
operational and financial performances both theoretically (Gaur and Seshadri 2005) and empirically
(Gaur et al. 2005). Consequently, we would expect that the association of sub-tier suppliers and
tier-0 firms introduced by supply chain relationships will be reflected in the association of their
financial performances as well.
Lately, using the Compustat data researchers have analyzed one-step supplier-customer connec-
tivity. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that stock returns of principal customer firms can forecast
future returns of supplier firms. Serpa and Krishnan (2015) empirically test how firm productiv-
ity is affected by productivity of its customer base. Both papers focus on direct one-step supply
chain relationships and the impact (or predictability) of customer performances on supplier per-
formances. Extending this line of inquiry, the next set of logical questions to ask include: 1) does
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connectivity with sub-tier suppliers also matter for the tier-0 firm’s performance? 2) If so, which
sub-tier suppliers matter more? 3) In particular, does the sub-tier network structure matter?
On the one hand, several recent industry reports cited earlier identify that a large number of
supply chain disruptions originate from suppliers below tier-1. Risks that originate from suppliers
in the extended supply chain have also been characterized in recent theoretical developments in
supply chain risk management. Christopher and Lee (2004) point out that increasing end-to-end
visibility is critical in mitigating supply chain risks. Using simulation, Schmitt and Singh (2012)
show that viewing the supply network as a whole can improve the resilience of a multi-echelon
supply chain. In the economics literature, using network analysis of input-output flows, Acemoglu
et al. (2012) provide a proof on how idiosyncratic shocks of individual firms or sectors can aggregate
through the supply network to become systematic shocks. Acemoglu et al. (2015) observe consistent
patterns in the propagation of sector-level shocks through input-output linkages. A clear inference
from these two last papers is that sub-tier suppliers play a role in the risk aggregation towards
tier-0 firms because idiosyncratic shocks propagate beyond immediate neighbors.
On the other hand, if intermediate tier-1 suppliers, through appropriate mitigating actions, have
fully internalized the risks from the tier-2 suppliers, sub-tier supplier risks may not be an additional
source of risk to the tier-0 firm. For example, Hopp and Yin (2006) show that it is sufficient
to simply build excess inventory or excess capacity at tier-1 supplier to hedge against supplier
risks. This conclusion, however, is only demonstrated for supply networks that take an arborescent
structure, wherein tier-1 suppliers’ sub-networks are isolated from each other. Thus, it is a priori
not obvious whether or not sub-tier suppliers impact the financial performance of the tier-0 firm,
which leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The financial risk of a tier-0 firm is positively associated with the financial risks
coming from its tier-2 suppliers, while controlling for average tier-1 suppliers’ risks.
Should connectivity with tier-2 suppliers matter for tier-0 firms’ performance, a legitimate follow-
up question is which tier-2 suppliers would matter more? If most supply networks are indeed
“barrel-shaped” rather than “pyramid-shaped” as Toyota discovered post Japan earthquake and
tsunami, such a “barrel-shaped” structure induced by overlapping tier-2 suppliers in multiple tier-
1s’ subnetworks will create risk interdependencies among the tier-1 suppliers. With interdependent
risks, merely controlling for average tier-1 supplier risk will be insufficient. Yang et al. (2012)
find that inter-dependence between supplier disruptions reduces buyers’ diversification benefits.
Masih-Tehrani et al. (2011) show that ignoring inter-dependency in supplier risks will lead to cost
underestimation and overstock in a multi-source supply chain. It is worth noting that interdepen-
dencies of supplier risks can be introduced for multiple reasons, including geographical proximity,
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common macro-economic shocks and overlapping supplier base. We focus on analyzing the impact
of interdependency caused by overlapping suppliers. Our conclusions are robust to the inclusion of
measures of tier-1 supplier geographical concentration and sub-sector concentration to account for
other sources of interdependencies, as shown in the Section 6.2.
Ang et al. (2015) explicitly model supply networks with and without overlapping tier-2 suppliers
and compare the optimal risk mitigation strategy for a tier-0 firm. They conclude that the tier-0
firm’s optimal risk mitigation strategy depends critically on the degree of tier-2 supplier overlap.
When there is a higher degree of overlap, direct mitigation strategies (e.g., safety stock and multi-
sourcing) are less effective than indirect strategies such as supply chain contracts, which induce
tier-1 suppliers to mitigate the upstream risk. We therefore hypothesize that shared tier-2 suppliers
matter more than non-shared tier-2 suppliers for tier-0 firms’ risks. The association is stronger
when the degree of overlapping is larger, i.e., shared by more tier-1 suppliers.
Hypothesis 2. The risk of a tier-0 firm is positively associated with the risks coming from its
common tier-2 suppliers shared by more than one tier-1 supplier, and the association is stronger
with a higher degree of commonality.
If the association between tier-0 firm risk and tier-2 supplier risk is stronger for more heavily
shared tier-2 suppliers, can we disentangle the impact of tier-2 suppliers and the impact of level
of sharing in the supply network? In other words, can we tell whether a tier-0 firm’s risk comes
from connectivity with risky tier-2 suppliers, or from having a risky supply network structure
that imbeds heavy sub-tier overlapping? To investigate this, we need measures of supply network
structure.
The social network literature posits several measures of network structure that have been used
to study risk propagation and its impacts. In particular, the most commonly used ones are degree
centrality (Wu and Birge 2014) and eigenvalue centrality (Acemoglu et al. 2012, Ahern 2013, Wu
and Birge 2014). These measures, however, do not capture the distinct attributes unique to supply
networks where firms are naturally sorted into tiers. We propose new network metrics that capture
supply networks’ sub-tier supplier commonality and test their impact on form performance. We
hypothesize that sub-tier supplier commonality has a direct impact on tier-0 firm risk:
Hypothesis 3. A higher level of tier-2 commonality in a firm’s supply network leads to greater
risks for the firm, controlling for average tier-1 and tier-2 supplier risks.
It is also worth noting that by separating the impact of sub-tier network structure from that of
sub-tier suppliers, we measure the causal impact of network structure on tier-0 firm risk. This is
because, while a tier-0 firm may control which tier-1 firms to source from and what risk mitigation
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actions to take based on its knowledge of tier-1 suppliers’ risks, it is usually unaware and often
does not control the level of sub-tier sharing. Similarly, tier-1 suppliers are also not knowledgeable
about the identity of other tier-1 suppliers and who they source from, and therefore, unaware of the
level of tier-2 sharing as well. The sub-tier network structure is thus exogenous to the unobserved
risk mitigation decisions made by both tier-0 and tier-1 firms, allowing us to measure the unbiased
causal effect.
3. Data
We collected supplier-customer relationship data from a new data source, Bloomberg, whose new
Supply Chain Function maps 35,000 firms with their suppliers and customers. We present reasons
why we choose the high-tech sector for the study of supply chain risks. We then compare supplier
coverage of Bloomberg and Compustat and discuss the potential coverage bias in our data.
3.1. Supplier-Customer Relationship Data
We obtain information regarding global high-tech firms and their suppliers from Bloomberg, a
privately held financial software, data and media company. Bloomberg established its new database
of supplier-customer relationships using multiple sources. One source, similar to Compustat, relies
on the SEC requirement that all US listed firms disclose their customers who comprise greater than
10% of annual revenues. In this SEC dataset, however, international suppliers are underrepresented,
and so are large suppliers of relatively small customers due to the 10% revenue cutoff. Bloomberg’s
database supplements the SEC dataset with information that firms disclose in a variety of media,
such as annual and quarterly reports, conference call transcripts, capital markets presentations,
sell-side conferences, company press releases, company websites, etc. (Davenport 2011). Using data
gleaned from these sources documented in several languages, the Bloomberg database offers a
comprehensive view of firm-level global supply chain relationships.
The Bloomberg dataset currently comprises supply chain relationships of 35,000 companies, and
reports the source and date for each of these identified relationships. For each relationship, it also
categorizes the nature of the product or service accounted for by the customer firm in the follow-
ing four buckets: cost of goods sold (COGS), capital expenditure on long-term assets (CAPEX),
research and development (R&D), and sales, general and administrative (SG&A). If available,
Bloomberg quantifies the supplier-customer relationship value in dollars. Bloomberg provides a
supplier list of every firm. For suppliers with quantified relationship value, it also specifies percent-
age of the firm’s cost that a supplier represents (% Cost) as well as percentage of that supplier’s
revenue the firm makes up (% Revenue). Table 1 lists sample data obtained from Bloomberg.
One drawback of Bloomberg supply chain relationship data is that it is a static snapshot of
existing supplier-customer relationships, lacking a historical perspective. The relationships are valid
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Table 1 Sample data from Bloomberg.
Name Country Market Cap Sales Surprise % Revenue Relationship Value Account As Type %Cost Source As Of Date
SAMSUNG ELECTRON South Korea 200.78B -0.0123
APPLIED MATERIAL United States 21.74B -0.0404 0.2 435.95M CAPEX 0.0804 *2012A CF 11/15/2012
JEONGMOON INFO South Korea 42.04M N.A. 0.26 1.77B COGS 0.0624 2013C3 CF 11/14/2012
IMARKET KOREA INC South Korea 818.83M -0.0151 0.3012 163.18M SG&A 0.0142 *2013C2 CF 7/26/2013
Notes. This table displays samples of supply data available on Bloomberg. It lists three Samsung Electron's suppliers. For each identified relationship, Bloomberg reports 
the relationship value, % revenue and % cost to the supplier and the customer, the data source and the as of date for the relationship.
relationships at the time (Oct to Dec 2013) of data collection by the authors, with most source dates
(i.e., the date when the relationship is disclosed) between first quarter of 2012 and the first quarter
of 2013. Assuming that supplier relationships are stable over short time horizons, we consider this
data as representative for supply chain relationships from 2011 to 2013.
3.2. Choice of Sector
There are three reasons for our choice of the high-tech sector. First, it is among the top few
sectors that reportedly faces a higher frequency of supply chain disruptions compared to others.
Schmidt and Raman (2015) identify disruptions by analyzing company press releases distributed
via the PRNewswire and Business Wire. According to their study, high-tech has the second largest
number of disruption announcements from 1998 to 2011 among all sectors following Chemicals
and Petroleum. Second, the hyper-competitive nature and rapid growth rate of the sector make
firms more vulnerable to supply disruptions (Taylor 2002). The now famous Nokia Ericsson case
illustrates how a fire at a supplier’s plant reshaped the European mobile phone market. Ericsson’s
slower response to the disruption, compared to Nokia, resulted in a loss in sales of approximately
$400 million within a quarter after the disruption (Eglin 2003). Ericsson lost 3 percent market share
to Nokia only 6 months after the incident. The short product life cycle, high demand variability
and aggressive competition make high-tech sector a particularly interesting test-bed for the study
of supply chain risks. The final reason for our choice is better data coverage. Early data collection
efforts from Bloomberg were focused on the high-tech sector for similar reasons we have listed
above. As a result, the high-tech sector has the most identified COGS percentage.
We use Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) to define sectors. GICS is an industry
taxonomy developed by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) for the global financial community and is available on Bloomberg terminals. We label all
firms in the information technology sector (GICS Code: 45-) and personal appliance sub-industry
(GICS Code: 252010) as high-tech firms. We include firms in personal appliance (e.g. Sony Corp.,
Panasonic Corp.) nevertheless to be consistent with definitions by North American Industry Clas-
sification System (NAICS), the commonly used industry code in US market research. We restrict
our attention to publicly traded firms because further empirical analysis requires knowledge of
financial and operational performances of firms, unavailable for private firms.
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We thus obtain around 8,000 publicly traded high-tech firms, among which 2,646 firms have
quantified supplier data. The 2,646 firms account for 81 percent of the total market capitalization
of the sector: the remaining firms tend to be small international firms. 67 percent of suppliers of
these high-tech firms also belong to the high-tech sector. In addition, many high-tech firms also
source from two other sub-industries, electrical equipment (GICS code: 201040) and machinery
(201060). Therefore, to ensure accuracy and representativeness of our supply network, we also
collect supplier information of firms in these sub-industries.
3.3. Data Preparation and Summary
Recall that the database classifies the nature of the supplier relationship into four categories: COGS,
CAPEX, R&D, and SG&A. We first exclude relationships other than COGS, because our study
focuses on risk aggregation resulting from repeated business relationships between a customer and
its suppliers. Second, because most non-quantified relationships are induced from media postings
instead of public filings including annual, quarterly and current reports, we exclude non-quantified
relationships for higher data accuracy. The resulting network consists of 4,538 firms, including 2,646
high-tech firms and 1,890 non-high-tech firms, and 13,670 directional links indicating supplier-
customer relationships. The non-high-tech firms serve as suppliers of high-tech firms and consist
of firms mostly from electrical equipment and machinery sectors.
We first compare supplier coverage of Bloomberg and Compustat, a commonly used data source
for constructing supply chain relationships. To conduct a fair comparison, and because all Com-
pustat relationships are quantified, we only consider quantified relationships from Bloomberg. As
shown in Table 2, for all S&P500 firms in the high-tech sector, Bloomberg on average identifies
four times more US suppliers and seven times more global suppliers compared to Compustat.
We then retrieve quarterly financial and operational data for high-tech firms and their suppliers to
evaluate firm performance from 2011 to 2013. The data includes stock price, market capitalization,
sales, financial leverage, return on asset, book to market ratio, days in inventory and inventory
growth. Firms are excluded if they are not actively listed for the study period. Performance outliers
are also excluded (i.e., firms with more than three years of inventory are excluded).
Table 3 displays the summary statistics of our data. We summarize supplier coverage in Panel
A and firms’ financial and operational performances in Panel B. An average high-tech firm in our
dataset has 5.1 suppliers quantified, who collectively contribute to 9.47% of its procurement costs
(COGS). The relatively small fraction of COGS accounted for, even though higher than what could
have been obtained using other data sets, underscores the challenge of identifying the supply base
more completely.
Given that Bloomberg data is a superset of Compustat data, it is likely that Bloomberg, too,
identifies proportionally more suppliers for US domestic firms than international firms. Moreover,
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Table 2 Suppliers identified by Bloomberg and by Compustat.
Name GICS
Market 
Capitalization 
($Mn)
GVKEY
Ticker 
Symbol
# of Suppliers identified 
in Compustat
# of US Suppliers 
identified in Bloomberg
# of Suppliers identified 
in Bloomberg
Facebook 451010 80,175          170617 FB 3 5 10
eBay Inc. 451010 55,800          114524 EBAY 0 4 5
Yahoo Inc. 451010 23,464          62634 YHOO 2 20 25
53,146          2 10 13
Microsoft Corp. 451030 247,930        12141 MSFT 12 49 93
Oracle Corp. 451030 153,645        12142 ORCL 4 14 19
Salesforce.com 451030 23,036          157855 CRM 0 6 6
141,537        5 23 39
Cisco Systems 452010 105,483        20779 CSCO 20 89 118
QUALCOMM Inc. 452010 102,851        24800 QCOM 3 9 17
Motorola Solutions Inc. 452010 15,248          7585 MSI 10 71 120
74,527          11 56 85
Apple Inc. 452020 442,008        1690 AAPL 10 51 120
EMC Corp. 452020 52,375          12053 EMC 9 17 18
Hewlett-Packard 452020 49,967          5606 HPQ 33 94 187
181,450        17 54 108
Grand Average 67,538          9 36 62
Notes. This table lists the number of suppliers reported in Compustat and Bloomberg databases. We include all suppliers reported in Compustat in 2009 and later. To 
simplify the table, we include the top three (highest market capitalization) SP500 firms that stay in the listed four sub-industries.
Stata Code:
gen customer=lower(cnms)
gen yr=year(datadate)
list gvkey customer yr if strpos(customer, "emc corp") & (yr>=2009)
Table 3 Summary Statistics.
Mean Standard Deviation N
Variable Overall Between Within # Firms # Observations
Pa el A
# Suppli rs count 5.1 14.04 2646
Cost Identifed % 9.47 15.48 2646
Cost Identified (US firms) % 11.54 17.98 445
Cost Identifed (OEM firms) % 56.29 34.23 19
Panel B
Log Market Capitalization $Mn 5.77 2.12 2.09 0.31 3707 39752
Financial Leverage (FL) ratio 1.71 2 1.55 1.26 3748 40164
Days in Inventory (DII) days 52.24 67.46 59.33 32.11 3331 34350
Inventory Growth(INGR) % 8.67 39.24 18.24 34.74 3476 35658
Gross Margin(GM) ratio 19.43 20.97 19.22 8.4 3532 37053
Book to Market (BTM) ratio 0.7 0.84 0.72 0.43 3694 38472
Return on Asset (ROA) ratio 1.13 40.63 21.76 34.33 3694 38472
Operational Margin(OM) ratio 3.98 12.378 10.17 7.05 3717 39215
since Bloomberg identifies many of its supply chain relationships from public disclosures or news
coverage, it is likely that large firms closer to the consumer market tend to get greater media
exposure and hence have more of their suppliers identified. For example, Apple Inc. provides its
entire supplier list and their plant locations directly on its website. In our data, the average cost
captured for a US firm is 11.54%, as compared to 9.47% for an average firm (see Table 3). Also,
the average cost captured the top 21 high-tech companies identified in IBIS Industry Research
report (IBISWorld 2015), is 56.29% suggesting that a firms size and its position in the supply
chain, upstream or downstream, may affect the proportion of its suppliers identified. We address
resulting coverage bias issues next.
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3.4. Assessment of Coverage Bias
Understanding what types of firms are more (or less) likely to have their supplier information
identified in the dataset is critical to assessing the impact of potential coverage bias on the esti-
mation results. In this section, we conduct several tests to examine the existence and magnitude
of potential coverage bias by country of origin, supply chain upstream and downstream positions
(as reflected by detailed industry code), and firm size.
It is reasonable to expect that each firm in the high-tech sector sources from at least one supplier.
We therefore use the percentage of having at least one supplier identified to evaluate what types
of firms are more (or less) likely to have biases in their supplier coverage. Table 4 demonstrates
how this measure varies across sub-industries and countries of origin. In each cell, we report the
number of firms and the percentage of firms with at least one supplier identified.
Table 4 Coverage Bias.
252010 451010 451020 451030 452010 452020 452030 453010
Household 
Durables
Internet 
Software & 
Services
IT Services Software
Communi-
cations 
Equipment
Computers 
& 
Peripherals
Electronic 
Equipment & 
Components
Semicon-
ductors
US 15 41 37 72 61 37 94 107 464
(0.73) (0.71) (0.78) (0.71) (0.84) (0.84) (0.82) (0.77) (0.78)
Japan 18 22 72 64 16 27 162 53 434
(0.78) (0.64) (0.90) (0.59) (0.94) (0.85) (0.90) (0.79) (0.82)
Korea 13 7 19 15 19 10 68 92 243
(0.92) (0.86) (0.89) (0.53) (0.68) (0.80) (0.68) (0.68) (0.71)
China 29 4 22 21 41 19 85 40 261
(0.79) (0.75) (0.59) (0.71) (0.76) (1.00) (0.72) (0.88) (0.77)
Taiwan 18 1 10 9 33 82 200 189 542
(0.89) (1.00) (0.80) (0.89) (0.97) (0.91) (0.88) (0.91) (0.89)
Other 33 10 78 63 36 24 111 56 411
(0.94) (0.80) (0.77) (0.79) (0.75) (0.96) (0.77) (0.77) (0.80)
All Locations 126 85 238 244 206 199 720 537 2355
(0.85) (0.72) (0.81) (0.70) (0.82) (0.90) (0.82) (0.81) (0.81)
Country\GICS All High-Tech
Notes. The number of firms in the related region and sub-industry is reported in each cell. Underneath, we report the percentage of firms that have at 
least one supplier identified in Bloomberg dataset.
At least one supplier identified by countries of origin and sub-industries
We find that firms operating in Taiwan and firms in the sub-industry Household Durable or
Computer & Peripherals are more likely to have at least one supplier identified in the data; that
is, these firms are likely to have more complete supplier information. Note that as compared to
other sub-industries such as semiconductor and IT services, these two sub-industries are closer
to the consumer market. We refer to the two sub-industries, Household Durable or Computer &
Peripherals, as “close-to-market” sub-industries. We also observe that larger firms tend to have
better supplier coverage: at $2,014 million, the average annual sales of firms with at least one
supplier identified is more than five times that of firms with no identified suppliers. We use a
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probit model to assess the impact of all three factors, country of origin, sub-industry code and firm
size, on the likelihood of having at least one supplier being identified (see Appendix Table A1).
The estimates confirm our previous conclusions. The results are also consistent when we change
the cutoff to at least five suppliers identified. These patterns provide the basis for our sub-sample
robustness tests to verify that our main results are not driven by the coverage bias.
4. Empirical Model
We propose several metrics to quantify the degree of tier-2 sharing, and discuss the risk measure
we use to characterize firm risks. Based on these metrics, we describe the empirical models and
interpret the model estimates.
4.1. Measures of Tier-2 Commonality
We introduce three metrics of tier-2 commonality : 1) degree of commonality, 2) diamond ratio
and 3) cosine commonality score. The first two metrics are based on the binary customer-supplier
relationship, while the third metric is based on customer-supplier relationship weighted by the
percentage of costs that a supplier represents. We construct both un-weighted and weighted mea-
sures of tier-2 commonality because it is unclear how sub-tier commonality affects risk. On the
one hand, one may expect a larger supplier, who represents a significant portion of the customer’s
COGS, to likely have a larger impact on the customer’s performance. Partially due to the lack of
a better measure to account for component criticality or the network location of a supplier, cost
percentage as a proxy for supplier significance has been used in theoretical papers that study how
economic fluctuations aggregate (Acemoglu et al. 2012) and empirical papers that study relation-
ships between supplier and customer returns (Menzly and Ozbas 2010). On the other hand, many
supply chain disruptions have routinely been reported to be caused by suppliers who account for
only a small portion of COGS, but constitute a major threat when impacted. For example, con-
sequent to the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011, shortage of components from the shared
sub-tier suppliers, like Renesas (chip supplier) and Merck (paint pigment supplier), caused month-
long production delays for the automotive manufacturers (Kyodo 2011, Sedgwick 2014). Despite
the small cost percentage of these components, disruptions at Renesas and Merck propagated to
manufactures owing to the component non-substitutability. Thus, the share of overall COGS may
or may not be a major driver of sub-tier supply risks. Hence, we introduce both cost-weighted and
non-cost-weighted measures for tier-2 commonality, and test their impacts in subsequent sections.
4.1.1. Degree of Commonality: We measure the degree of tier-2 supplier commonality as
follows. Consider the simple two-tier supply network depicted in Figure 1, in which Firm 0 has
three tier-1 suppliers, labeled A, B, and C, and three tier-2 suppliers, labeled X, Y and Z. Note
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Figure 1 Illustration of common tier-2 supplier with degree of tier-2 commonality k = 3.
0
A
B
C
X
Y
Z
Tier-0 Tier-1 Tier-2
that supplier Y is shared by all tier-1 suppliers, while suppliers X and Z are not shared. The degree
of sharing of a tier-2 supplier is reflected by the number of paths that connect the tier-0 firm to
the tier-2 supplier. In this figure, there are three paths from the tier-0 firm to the tier-2 firm Y,
while only one path from the tier-0 firm to X and Z, respectively. A tier-2 supplier is considered
shared if there is more than one path that links a tier-0 firm to that tier-2 supplier.
We now define the pair-wise degree of commonality as the number of paths that link every pair
of a tier-0 firm and a tier-2 supplier. To obtain an aggregate measure of degree of commonality
for the tier-0 firm, we take the average of the pair-wise degree of commonality of all pairs of tier-0
and tier-2s. In Figure 1, the aggregate degree of commonality of the tier-0 firm is (1 + 3 + 1)/3 =
1.66, which indicates that an average tier-2 supplier of the focal tier-0 firm is shared by 1.66 tier-1
suppliers. Thus, a degree of commonality equal to 1 indicates no sharing through tier-1 suppliers,
while a value greater than 1 indicates existence of sharing through the corresponding number of
tier-1 suppliers.
4.1.2. Diamond Ratio: While degree of commonality is an intuitive measure indicating the
number of tier-1 suppliers that share a tier-2 supplier, the measure is influenced by the number of
tier-1 suppliers that a firm has. That is, a tier-0 firm with more tier-1 suppliers is more likely to
have a higher degree of commonality. This may introduce a bias between the degree of commonality
and firm size because a large firm with higher number of identified immediate suppliers will tend
to have a higher degree of commonality. To address this potential issue we propose another metric,
diamond ratio, which normalizes the degree of commonality with the size of the tier-1 supply base.
Specifically, the diamond ratio of each tier-0 firm is obtained by dividing the degree of common-
ality by the number of tier-1 suppliers. This metric also has an alternative intuitive interpretation.
One can view the diamond ratio as the number of observed tier-0 to tier-2 paths over the num-
ber of all possible paths in a firm’s supply network. Note that the number of all possible paths
is precisely the product of the number of tier-1 suppliers and the number of tier-2 suppliers. For
example, the diamond ratio of the tier-0 firm in the supply network depicted in Figure 1 equals
5/(3× 3) = 0.56. By definition, the diamond ratio can only take a value between 0 and 1, and a
higher value indicates the presence of more common tier-2 suppliers.
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4.1.3. Cosine Commonality Score: Our third measure, cosine commonality score, considers
cost weighted supplier-customer relationships. First, we define the cost percentage matrix C where
Cij denotes the percentage of customer firm j’s COGS contributed by firm i. Let matrix A denote
the binary customer-supplier relationship, namely Aij = 1(Cij > 0). The rows of C and A are
indexed by supplier firms and the columns are indexed by customer firms. If the supplier-customer
relationship data is complete, the column sum of C should be 1, as the data identifies the entire
allocation of COGS among a firm’s supply base. Using matrices C and A, we define the Cosine
Commonality Score (CCS) of firm i as
CCSi = median
j 6=m,Aji=Ami=1
cos(C·,j,C·,m) = median
j 6=m,Aji=Ami=1
〈C·,j ,C·,m〉
‖C·,j‖2 ‖C·,m‖2
where C·,j is the jth column of C. cos(C·,j,C·,m) represents the pair-wise cosine similarity between
the cost distributions of tier-1 supplier j and m. Cosine similarity measures the cosine of the angle
between two vectors of an inner product space. The cosine similarity between any two firms ranges
from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no shared supplier, and 1 indicates that two firms have the exact
same supply base: same suppliers and same spend. We then aggregate the pair-wise measure for the
tier-0 firm over all pairs of its tier-1 suppliers. We choose median (rather than mean) among all the
pair-wise cosine similarities because of the high skewness of the distribution of cosine similarities.
Similar to the diamond ratio, a higher value of cosine commonality score suggests the presence of
more tier-2 sharing.
4.2. Risk Measure
4.2.1. Firm Risk Ideally, we can construct firm risk from its operational performance. How-
ever, due to the unobservability of operational impact and the lack of facility-level data, we opt
for the next best alternative of evaluating firm risk based on its financial performance. Given the
close link between a firm’s financial and operational performances, we believe that the association
of sub-tier suppliers and tier-0 firms introduced by supply chain relationships will also be reflected
in the association of their financial performances.
Stock return volatility, often referred to as firm total equity risk, is our dependent variable. It
is measured by the variance of the rate of return of the firm’s equity over a certain time period.
In this study, we use a three-month time window. The total equity risk of firm i in quarter t,
VOLit = Var(Rid), d∈ t, where Rid represents daily return on day d. The variance of equity return
has been widely used as a measure of firm total risk in previous research (e.g., May 1995, Guay
1999, Hendricks and Singhal 2005b). Because VOLit is a measure that takes only positive values,
we use its logarithm, denoted as volit, in subsequent regression analyses.
Asset pricing models suggest that a firm’s total equity risk is affected by both systematic risks and
idiosyncratic risks. Systematic risks refer to risks that cannot be eliminated by diversification. For
Wang, Li and Anupindi: Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains?
16 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no.
example, all equities take on certain levels of, albeit different, market risk that are non-diversifiable.
Idiosyncratic risk refers to the risk that can be avoided through a diversified portfolio. For exam-
ple, the risk of a plant shut-down due to floods can be mitigated by investing in firms located
in non-flood prone regions. There are reasons to believe that supply chain linkages contribute to
both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Even though a supply chain disruption is typically con-
sidered firm-specific and therefore should contribute only to the idiosyncratic risk that a firm is
exposed to, recent studies conjecture that supply network structure may be a source of systematic
risks. Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that microeconomic idiosyncratic shocks can lead to aggregate
fluctuations through inter-sectoral input-output linkages. Even though the model they propose is
not an asset pricing model, it lays the foundation for why idiosyncratic risks may aggregate to
become a systematic risk. A more recent study by Ahern (2013) finds that connectivity to suppliers
explains why the more central firms take on greater levels of systematic risks. Therefore, instead
of isolating systematic risk from the total risk, we decide to use the total risk as our dependent
variable. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to establish supply network as a factor
in asset pricing models or to evaluate its asset pricing implications.
4.2.2. Supplier Risks To test the impact of suppliers on tier-0 firm risk, we aggregate sup-
pliers’ risks by tier. We follow Menzly and Ozbas (2010) to create portfolios of supplier firms and
weight each supplier using a normalized cost percentage, from the perspective of a tier-0 firm. For
example, if a firm has only two identified tier-1 suppliers, and spends an equal amount between the
two to acquire necessary inputs from them, we compute the tier-1 supplier risk as the average of
the stock return volatilities of the two suppliers. For a tier-0 firm i, we let SPL volit denote tier-1
supplier risk, and T2SPL volit denote tier-2 supplier risk in quarter t.
SPL volit =
∑
j Cji× voljt∑
j Cji
, and T2SPL volit =
∑
j [C
2]ji× voljt∑
j [C
2]ji
. (1)
Cji represents the percentage of firm i’s cost attributed to supplier j, and
∑
j Cji is the total
percentage of COGS of firm i identified. C2 is the squared matrix of C, where [C2]ji =
∑
kCjkCki
is the percentage of firm i’s cost attributed to its tier-2 supplier j. In addition to the aggregate
risk measures at each tier, we are particularly interested in risks originating from common tier-2
suppliers. Let T2COMSPL volkit denote risks of those tier-2 suppliers that are shared by at least k
tier-1 suppliers. It can be computed as the weighted risks of common tier-2 suppliers of firm i in
quarter t with at least k degree of tier-2 commonality.
T2COMSPL volkit =
∑
j:[A2]ji≥k [C
2]ji× voljt∑
j:[A2]ji≥k [C
2]ji
. (2)
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Recall that matrix A is the binary indicator matrix of supplier-customer relationship, namely Aij =
1(Cij > 0). [A
2]ji is the pair-wise degree of commonality of supplier j in firm i’s supply network,
and [A2]ji ≥ k denotes the set of tier-2 suppliers that are shared by at least k tier-1 suppliers.
4.3. Other Independent Variables
There are other factors that can potentially affect firm risk. Firm size measured by the logarithm of
a firm’s net sales in the previous twelve months, and financial leverage measured by the total asset
over common stock equity ratio, are two important determinants of firm equity risk (Ben-Zion and
Shalit 1975). Additionally, following Schmidt and Raman (2015) we also include firm profitability
as a factor influencing firm risk. Return on assets, operating margin, and gross margin are three
measures of firm profitability. Due to collinearity, we only include return on assets in the regression
and our results are robust to alternative measures of profitability.
Firm equity risk is also affected by the amount of inventory that a firm holds. The supply
chain literature has long studied the role of inventory as a buffer against uncertain supply and
demand (e.g., Ritchken and Tapiero 1986, Chen et al. 2007, Hopp et al. 2008). Using data from
publicly listed US retailers, Alan et al. (2014) find that inventory productivity can predict future
stock returns. We include both inventory level (days in inventory) and inventory growth rate in
our explanatory variables. Holding everything else constant, firms with higher inventory levels are
better able to buffer supply and demand uncertainties. Inventory growth rate is associated with
future firm performance, and hence firm risks; higher inventory growth rates may either indicate
excess supply relative to realized demand or an expectation of faster growth. Inventory held by
suppliers also reduce supply risks faced by their customers. Therefore, we also control for tier-1
suppliers’ inventory level by taking a COGS weighted average of each supplier’s inventory level.
We also control for the quarterly volatility of a firm’s trading market. We obtain index per-
formances for the following trading markets, United States (SPX Index), Japan (NKY Index),
Korea (KOSPI Index), Taiwan (TWOTCI Index), Mainland China (SHASHR Index), France (CAC
Index), India (SENSEX Index), Hongkong (HSI Index), United Kingdom (UKX Index) and Ger-
many (DAX Index). Firms in our data are traded in 60 different markets. We estimate a fixed effect
using a small trading market dummy for the firms traded in the other markets — each contains
less than 1% of firms in our sample. Multinational firms do not necessarily trade in countries of
their main business locations, so we create dummy variables for firms’ headquarter locations as
well. A firm’s stock performance can be influenced by the volatility intrinsic to a trading market
and the level of economic uncertainties in the country of operation. The geographic distribution
of firms’ operating locations in our sample is as follows, Japan (20%), United States (19%), Tai-
wan (16%), Mainland China(14%), and South Korea (10%). We group firms operating in other
origins as “other” in our regression analyses. Sub-industry dummies for every 6-digit GICS code
are included as well to control for industry specific risks.
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4.4. Model Specification
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of a firm i’s stock price volatility in quarter t, volit. Vari-
ables of interest are tier-2 supplier risk, common tier-2 supplier risk, and the measure of sub-tier
network structure, diamond ratio (DMD) and cosine commonality score (CCS). Other indepen-
dent variables include market risk (MKT volit), tier-1 supplier risk (SPL volit), and financial and
operational characteristics denoted by matrix Xit. Xit contains firm i’s days in inventory, inven-
tory growth rate, firm size, financial leverage, book-to-market ratio, return on asset, and weighted
supplier days in inventory in quarter t. Vector Di contains the headquarter location dummies and
the sub-industry dummies.
volit = α0 + +α1MKT volit +α2SPL volit +Xitγ+Diφ+ it (3)
volit = α0 + β1T2SPL volit +α1MKT volit +α2SPL volit +Xitγ+Diφ+ it (4)
volit = α0 + β
k
2T2COMSPL vol
k
it +α1MKT volit +α2SPL volit +Xitγ+Diφ+ it (5)
volit = α0 + β3T2SPL volit + β4DMDi +α1MKT volit +α2SPL volit +Xitγ+Diφ+ it (6)
volit = α0 + β3T2SPL volit +β4CCSi +α1MKT volit +α2SPL volit +Xitγ+Diφ+ it (6’)
Equation 3 is the base model excluding variables of interest. Equation 4 adds the tier-2 supplier
risk and tests Hypothesis 1. We anticipate a positive β1, which indicates a positive association
between tier-2 supplier risk and the tier-0 firm’s risk. Equation 5 estimates the impact of common
tier-2 suppliers on the tier-0 firm’s risk, which tests Hypothesis 2. We expect βk2 to be positive and
increases as the degree of commonality k increases. Equation 6 tests Hypothesis 3. It separates
the impact of tier-2 supplier risk and sub-tier network structure on the tier-0 firm’s risk. We again
expect a positive coefficient for tier-2 supplier risks, β3. We also anticipate a positive effect of the
diamond ratio (DMD) and cosine commonality score (CCS). That is, a supply network with larger
overlapping in tier-2 suppliers leads to higher tier-0 firm risk. In addition to the direction, we are
also interested in the scale of the coefficients, especially their magnitude relative to coefficients of
the market risk, α1, and of tier-1 supplier risk, α2.
4.5. A Note on Causality
We make a note on the causal implication of these estimates. Coefficients of supplier risks, α2
(tier-1 supplier risks), β1, β
k
2 , β3 (tier-2 or common tier-2 supplier risks) should not be interpreted
as causal for two reasons. First, firms engage in various risk management activities to mitigate
risks arising from suppliers. For example, besides building inventory buffers (which we control for),
firms also use multiple sourcing and flexible capacity to mitigate the impact of potential supply
chain disruptions. Existence of these unobserved firm decisions, which are correlated with both
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supplier risks and the firm’s risk, will generate omitted variable bias in estimating the impact of
supplier risks. This is not only true for the coefficients of tier-1 supplier risk, but also true for the
coefficients of tier-2 supplier risk. Even though the tier-0 firms typically do not take actions directly
in response to tier-2 supplier risks due to lack of visibility, risk mitigation actions taken by tier-1
suppliers can also contribute to the omitted variable bias. Tier-1 suppliers may take risk mitigation
actions according to the level of risks coming from tier-2. Meanwhile, such activities at tier-1s can
help tier-0 firms mitigate supply disruptions — even though we control for tier-1 supplier inventory,
other firm decisions are unobserved. Such bias, however, tends to be a downward bias, which can
be in favor of our analysis because we expect a positive sign.
Second, in addition to supply shocks that propagate downstream, demand shocks that propagate
upstream can also contribute to the observed correlation between the tier-0 firm’s risk and its
suppliers’ risks, such as in the bullwhip effect (Bray and Mendelson 2012). This reverse causality
can also bias the estimates, likely in the upward direction. Identifying exogenous supply shocks
may address both biases. However, collecting a sufficiently large number of supply shocks that
impact a broad cross-section of firms is beyond the scope of this paper (Wu 2015).
Even though the coefficients of supplier risks cannot be interpreted as causal, we believe that
the impact of network structure, and in particular the sub-tier structure, is most likely causal.
First, firms typically do not have visibility into tier-2 suppliers, nor the contractual power to
dictate who their tier-1 suppliers should or should not source from. As a result, it is unlikely firms
will be capable of taking actions in response to sub-tier supplier commonality. Second, in wake
of the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011 even though a few large manufacturing firms have
discovered overlapping sub-tier structure in their supply network, the process of mapping out sub-
tier suppliers has just begun and firms are not fully aware of its extent and impact, let alone taking
systematic actions to address the issue. Third, even though tier-1 suppliers contract directly with
tier-2 suppliers, tier-1s are typically unaware of other tier-1s. This makes it impossible for tier-1
suppliers to take any collective action to avoid overlaps in their supplier bases either. In sum, due
to the limited visibility into supply chain network from both the tier-0 and tier-1 firms and the
lack of direct influence from the tier-0 firm, the estimated impact of tier-2 commonality, diamond
ratio and cosine commonality score in Equation 6 is most likely a causal impact.
5. Empirical Results
We first describe the basic network properties of our high-tech supply network and demonstrate
the prevalence of common tier-2 suppliers. We then show how tier-2 supplier commonality affects
tier-0 firm risk.
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5.1. Tier-2 Commonality
In our network, an average high-tech firm is connected to three suppliers and three customers. This
network, though sparse, turns out to be highly connected. The network involves a few complete
disjoint subnetworks (components), and the largest connected component of the supply network,
in which any two firms are connected to each other by undirected paths, contains around 95% of
all firms. The average length of the shortest paths between any two firms within the component
is 3.93. As we are interested in the impact of tier-2 supplier commonality, for further analysis, we
focus our attention to the 4,253 firms in the largest connected component.
Table 5 shows summary statistics of all three measures of tier-2 commonality, 1) degree of
commonality, 2) diamond ratio, and 3) cosine commonality score. We find that the median degree
of commonality of all tier-0 high-tech firms is 1.05, suggesting that more than half of the firms
have common tier-2 suppliers in their supply networks. Using degree of commonality, we identify
Table 5 Statistics of tier-2 commonality measures.
Degree of Commonality Diamond Ratio Cosine Commonality
Mean 1.160 0.297 0.048
Standard Deviation 0.251 0.181 0.130
.25 percentile 1.000 0.150 0.000
Median 1.068 0.289 0.000
.75 percentile 1.230 0.500 0.017
.95 percentile 1.690 0.550 0.297
Notes. Statistics are computed for high-tech firms that have at least two suppliers reported .
tier-2 firms that are heavily shared and also tier-0 firms whose supply network involves most tier-2
sharing. Table 6 lists all tier-2 firms who are shared by a large number of tier-1 suppliers, i.e., greater
than or equal to 20, in any tier-0 firm’s network. Most of the heavily shared tier-2 suppliers are
semiconductor companies. Numbers in the final column of the table represent the number of tier-0
firms that source from these tier-2 suppliers. Our data also indicates that these tier-2 suppliers are
not necessarily immediate suppliers of the associated tier-0 firm, implying that without sub-tier
visibility, firms may not realize that they rely on a particular set of sub-tier suppliers. For instance,
20 of Dell’s tier-1 suppliers and 24 of HP’s tier-1 suppliers source from Stats Chippac Ltd., who
does not directly supply to any of the S&P500 hardware manufacturers.
Table 7 lists all tier-0 firms whose supply network relies on these heavily shared tier-2 firms.
Most of them are in the Technology Hardware & Equipment industry (GICS code: 4520x). The
table also indicates that many tier-2 suppliers are shared in these firms’ supply networks — 35%
are shared by at least two tier-1 suppliers, and more than 10% are shared by at least five tier-1s.
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Table 6 Tier-2 suppliers with a high degree of tier-2 commonality.
Tier-2 Supplier Name GICS
Headquarter 
Location
# of tier-0 firms that source from the 
listed tier-2 supplier who is shared by at 
least 20 of their tier-1 suppliers
Flextronics International Ltd. 452030 USA 2
Avago Technologies 453010 Singapore 2
Microsoft Corporation 451030 USA 2
Nitto Denko Corporation 151010 Japan 1
Atmel Corporation 453010 USA 1
Intel Corporation 453010 USA 3
LSI Corporation 453010 USA 2
Qualcomm Inc. 452010 USA 2
Texas Instruments Inc. 453010 USA 6
United Microelectronics Corporation 453010 Taiwan 4
ON Semiconductor 453010 USA 2
Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. 453010 Taiwan 8
Taiwan Semiconductor Ltd. 453010 Taiwan 13
Amkor Technology Inc. 453010 USA 11
ARM Holdings plc 453010 Great Britain 11
Broadcom Corporation 453010 USA 2
STATS ChipPAC Ltd. 453010 Singapore 5
NXP Semiconductors 453010 Netherlands 1
Notes . Almost all heavily shared Tier-2s stay in Semiconductor industry (453010).
Table 7 Tier-0 firms with common tier-2 suppliers.
Name GICS
Headquarter 
Location
Market 
Capitalization 
($Mn)
# of tier-2s 
identified
# of tier-2s 
shared by at least 
two tier-1s
# of tier-2s 
shared by at least 
five tier-1s
# of tier-2s 
shared by at least 
twenty tier-1s
Cisco Systems, Inc. 452010 USA 105,483            523 195 53 3
Dell Inc. 452020 USA 25,465              847 340 114 6
Hewlett-Packard Company 452020 USA 49,967              865 357 123 8
LG Electronics Inc. 252010 South Korea 10,776              799 321 83 4
Apple Inc. 452020 USA 442,008            889 333 110 3
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 453010 South Korea 143,504            956 346 105 6
Sony Corporation 252010 Japan 19,422              816 282 73 2
IBM Corporation 451020 USA 214,975            853 331 106 1
Lenovo Group Ltd. 452020 China 8,708                838 333 91 1
WPG Holdings Ltd. 452030 Taiwan 2,141                652 225 49 3
Avnet, Inc. 452030 USA 4,799                720 286 88 6
Arrow Electronics Inc. 452030 USA 4,274                926 366 122 6
Ingram Micro 452030 USA 2,890                1100 481 198 12
Nokia Corporation 452020 Finland 18,864              675 225 53 4
Alcatel-Lucent S.A. 452010 France 6,584                418 150 34 1
Ericsson 452010 Sweden 36,616              638 188 44 1
Motorola Solutions, Inc. 452010 USA 15,248              619 190 32 2
Tech Data Corporation 452030 USA 2,008                1099 435 173 9
5.2. Impact of Tier-2 Commonality
We estimate Equations 3, 4 and 5 using fixed effects models to account for potential unobserved
firm characteristics, which can also be correlated with other covariates. For example, firms with
higher supply risks are more likely to use flexible capacity, which in turn reduces risks. The use of
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fixed effect models eliminates the bias coming from time-invariant firm characteristics. When we
are interested in the coefficient of sub-tier network structure measures, namely the diamond ratio
and cosine commonality score, fixed effects models are no longer valid because fixed effects will
absorb the effects of time-invariant sub-tier network structure. Instead, we use a random effects
model. The coefficients of sub-tier network structure are likely unbiased, because unobserved firm
activities are not correlated with tier-2 supplier commonality as discussed in Section 4.5.
Table 8 provides the model estimates. Column (a) shows the estimates for the base model in
Equation 3 with no tier-2 related variables. As expected, the market risk explains most variations
in the firm’s total risk. The positive significant coefficient of tier-1 supplier risk is consistent with
previous research, confirming that customer and supplier share correlated risks through their rela-
tionship. The signs of the estimates of other covariates are consistent with the literature as well.
As a reflection to the risk of debt and overvalued stock prices, firms with higher leverage and lower
book-to-market ratio experience higher stock return volatility. We also find that days of inventory
of immediate suppliers is negatively associated with the risk of tier-0 firms. On average, a firm’s
stock return volatility reduces by 3.7% when its suppliers’ inventory doubles.
Table 8 Common tier-2s
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Log Volatility Tier-2 shared by Tier-2 shared by Tier-2 shared by Tier-2 shared by
Base Case Tier-2 ≥ 2 Tier-1s ≥ 3 Tier-1s ≥ 4 Tier-1s ≥ 5 Tier-1s
Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.025
(0.021)
Common Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.017 0.035 0.098*** 0.197***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.033) (0.048)
Market Risk 0.463*** 0.459*** 0.461*** 0.461*** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tier-1 Supplier Risk 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Financial and Operational controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848
Number of Firms 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277
R-squared 0.7147 0.7148 0.7148 0.7148 0.7149 0.7152
Notes. Robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are shown in parenthesis. All the covariates are included with log transformation. The overall R-squared
value is reported in all columns. To simplify the table, we do not report on controls.  *** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
Column (b) reports the estimates of Equation 4, including the tier-2 supplier risk. The coefficient
of tier-2 supplier risk is positive yet not statistically significant at 0.1 level. We note that this
coefficient measures the average effect of tier-2 supplier risk and does not account for the hetero-
geneity among tier-2 suppliers. We are particularly interested, however, in the effects of common
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tier-2 suppliers. We estimate Equation 5 for different degrees of commonality, k = 2,3,4 and 5.
The estimates are shown in Column (c) to Column (f). We observe that both the magnitude and
significance of the estimates increase with the degree of commonality.
We note that the coefficients of market risk, tier-1 supplier risk, (common) tier-2 supplier risk
are at comparable scales. The coefficients of common tier-2 supplier risk become larger than that
of tier-1 supplier risk when the degree of commonality is greater than or equal to 4. In particular,
when a tier-2 supplier is shared by five or more tier-1 suppliers, a 10% increase in tier-2 supplier
risk is associated with 1.97% increase in the risk of the tier-0 firm. Note that even though only
2.3% of tier-2 suppliers are shared by five or more tier-1s, the impact of these small numbers of
heavily shared tier-2s is almost half the size of the impact of the market (4.59%). The results can
also be interpreted in terms of changes in standard deviations. When k= 5, one standard deviation
increase in the common tier-2 supplier risk is associated with an increase of 0.79 standard deviation
in a tier-0 firm’s risk. Note that the results in terms of changes in standard deviations are evaluated
at the mean value. In summary, our results show strong support for Hypothesis 2, though only
mild (not statistically significant) support for Hypothesis 1.
Table 9 Sub-tier supply network
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Log Volatility Diamond Tier-2 & Cosine Tier-2 & 
Base Case Tier-2  Ratio Diamond Ratio Commonality Cosine Commonality
Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.025 0.037* 0.037*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Diamond Ratio 0.378*** 0.384***
(0.126) (0.126)
Cosine Commonality 0.371*** 0.374***
(0.140) (0.141)
Market Risk 0.463*** 0.459*** 0.462*** 0.456*** 0.462*** 0.456***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Tier-1 Supplier Risk 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.064***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Financial and Operational controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country, Sector controls N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848
Number of Firms 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277
R-squared 0.7147 0.7148 0.2490 0.2501 0.2511 0.2524
Notes. Robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are shown in parenthesis. All the covariates are included with log transformation except for the sub-tier
network measures. Column (c) to Column (f) are estimated with REs. To simplify the table, we do not report on controls.
*** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
To formally test how sub-tier network structure affects firm risk (Hypothesis 3), we estimate
Equation 6 using two measures of tier-2 commonality. In Table 9, columns (c) and (d) display
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the estimates using the diamond ratio, while columns (e) and (f) report the estimates using the
cosine commonality score. We repeat the results from columns (a) and (b) in Table 8 for easy
comparison. We observe consistent estimates on most variables across all models, albeit using the
random effects model as opposed to the fixed effects model. The coefficient of the diamond ratio
is significant at 0.01 level, and it suggests a 6.9% or 0.58 standard deviation increase in tier-0
risk if the diamond ratio increases by one standard deviation. Similar results are found for the
alternative measure, the cosine commonality score. The estimate is significant at 0.01 level as well,
and one standard deviation increase in the cosine commonality score leads to 4.8% or 0.41 standard
deviation increase in tier-0 risk. The inclusion or exclusion of tier-2 supplier risk in the model does
not change the magnitude and the significance of the estimates of both sub-tier network measures,
suggesting that the network measure is indeed orthogonal to tier-2 supplier risk. Thus, we find
support for Hypothesis 3.
6. Robustness Tests
6.1. Subsample analysis
We demonstrated in Section 3.3 that firm size, headquarter location and the sub-industry a firm
belongs to may bias the completeness of supplier data. In particular, we notice that the quality of
supply information is best for large consumer electronics and computer firms (GICS code: 252010 or
452020) and for firms operating in US and Taiwan. Therefore, we test our models on the following
four subsamples: 1) large firms — firms with average monthly market capitalization greater than
75 percentile in the complete sample; 2) close-to-market firms — firms in the sub-industries of
consumer electronics and computers; 3) large close-to-market firms; and 4) US and Taiwan firms.
The results are shown in Table 10. For easy comparison, we repeat the original full sample esti-
mates in column (a). Panel A shows the subsample estimates for common tier-2 supplier risks in
Equation 5. Panel B and C show the subsample estimates for sub-tier network measures, diamond
ratio and cosine commonality score, in Equation 6. In Panel A, the estimates have similar magni-
tude, and are significant in all subsample tests but one, column (c) close to market firms. However,
once we further restrict our attention to large close-to-market firms, the impact of common tier-2
suppliers remain significant and with a larger magnitude than in the full sample estimate.
Similar results can be seen in Panel B. The impact of the diamond ratio is consistently estimated
across all subsamples. Estimates are significant in all subsample tests but one, viz., column (b)
large firms. We note that the subsample of large firms contains proportionally more semiconductor
firms and electrical equipment firms, which tend to be at the upstream end of their supply chains.
Supplier information tends to be less complete for such firms. Once we restrict our attention to
large close-to-market firms alone, the estimate again becomes significant, and larger than in the
Wang, Li and Anupindi: Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains?
Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. 25
Table 10 Subsample tests
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Log Volatility Close-to- Large Close-to- Taiwan or
All samples Large Firms Market Firms Market Firms US Firms
Common Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.089 0.285** 0.186***
    (shared by>=5 Tier-1s) (0.048) (0.072) (0.098) (0.138) (0.054)
Diamond Ratio 0.384*** 0.128 0.787** 1.681** 0.549***
(0.126) (0.232) (0.314) (0.686) (0.193)
Cosine Commonality 0.374*** 0.167 0.346 0.541 0.272
(0.141) (0.186) (0.347) (0.378) (0.244)
All Panels
Observations 25,848 3,627 4,529 861 10,932
Number of Firms 2,277 315 383 72 963
Panel A. Common tier-2s
sector and missing controls. *** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
Notes. Robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are shown in parenthesis. All the covariates are included with log transformation except for 
the network measures. To simplify the table, we do not report on market risk, tier-1 supply risk, financial and operational covariates, country,
Panel C. Sub-tier supply network (cosine commonality)
Panel B. Sub-tier supply network (diamond ratio)
full sample estimate. In Panel C, we observe that the cosine commonality score estimate is also at
similar levels of magnitude across all subsample tests, but with low significance level.
We conclude that common tier-2 supplier risk is strongly correlated with tier-0 firm risk, and
that sub-tier network measure, in particular the diamond ratio, affects tier-0 firm risk. We also
note that the impact may vary across different subsamples (either due to data coverage bias or
heterogeneity). In particular, the impact is most profound for large and downstream firms. We also
note that, among the two sub-tier network measures, the significance of the diamond ratio tends to
be more robust than that of the cosine commonality score. While the diamond ratio measures tier-
2 commonality without weights, the cosine commonality score is weighted by COGS percentage.
This evidence suggests that COGS percentage contributed by suppliers may not necessarily be a
strong indicator of its impact on a tier-0 firm’s risk, but a structural measure of commonality (like
the diamond ratio) is.
6.2. Tier-1 Supplier Concentration
It is possible that firms with tier-1 suppliers located in geographical proximity or from the same
sub-industry are more likely to have common tier-2 suppliers. Additionally, firms also tend to source
with suppliers that belong to compatible sub-industries. That is, the level of tier-2 commonality
can be correlated with geographical or industry concentration of tier-1 suppliers. Meanwhile, tier-1
supplier concentration itself is likely to be correlated with tier-0 firm risk, which may in turn bias
our estimates. Therefore, in this section, we test whether the effect of tier-2 supplier commonality
can actually be explained away by tier-1 supplier geographical or industry-wise concentration.
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We compute the tier-1 concentration using the Herfindahl index, H =
∑N
i=1 p
2
i , where N is the
total number of countries of origins (sub-industries), and pi represents the share of firms’ tier-1
suppliers in the ith country (sub-industry). Intuitively, a smaller Herfindahl index indicates a less
concentrated, or in other words, more diversified tier-1 supplier base. Results in columns (b) to
(d) in Table 11 confirm that the measured impacts of the diamond ratio and cosine commonality
score are robust after controlling for tier-1 geographic and industry concentration. The magnitude
of the effects is also similar compared to that in the original analyses, which is provided in column
(a) in the same table.
Table 11 Tier-1 supplier concentration
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (a) (b) (c) (d)
Log Volatility Tier-2 & Geographic Sub-industry Both 
Sub-tier supply network Concentration Concentration Concentrations
Diamond Ratio 0.384*** 0.532*** 0.357*** 0.493***
(0.126) (0.136) (0.139) (0.147)
Geographic Concentration -0.200*** -0.203***
(0.073) (0.073)
Sub-industry Concentration 0.045 0.058
(0.071) (0.071)
Panel B Sub-tier supply network (cosine commonality)
Cosine Commonality 0.374*** 0.399*** 0.356** 0.384***
(0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.139)
Geographic Concentration -0.088 -0.144**
(0.063) (0.067)
Sub-industry Concentration 0.094* 0.141**
(0.057) (0.060)
All Panels
Observations 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848
Number of Firms 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277
Notes. Robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are shown in parenthesis. All the covariates are included with log transformation except for 
the network measures. To simplify the table, we do not report on market risk, tier-1 supply risk, financial and operational covariates, country,
sector and missing controls. *** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
Panel A. Sub-tier supply network (diamond ratio)
6.3. Tier-2 Suppliers: Semiconductor vs. Non-Semiconductor Firms
In the previous analysis, we document that the most heavily shared tier-2 suppliers are semicon-
ductor firms while most tier-0 firms whose supply network involves heavily shared tier-2 suppliers
sell directly to consumers. We also find that there is a strong positive association between the risk
of these heavily shared tier-2s and the risk of the associated tier-0 firms. One may suspect that the
relationship we observe may simply come from the correlation between these two sub-industries.
To test whether this is the case, we construct additional risk measures for semiconductor and
non-semiconductor tier-2 suppliers, respectively.
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Table 12 Tier-2 suppliers: semiconductor vs. non-semiconductor firms
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (a) (b) (c) (d)
Log Volatility Tier-2 shared by Semi-conductor Tier-2 Other Tier-2 Tier-2 shared by
>=5 Tier-1s shared by >=5 Tier-1s shared by >=5 Tier-1s ≥ 5 Tier-1s (Separate)
Common Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.197***
(0.048)
Semi-conductor Common Tier-2 Supplier Risk 0.151*** 0.099*
(0.049) (0.055)
Other CommonTier-2 Supplier Risk 0.158*** 0.110*
(0.051) (0.057)
Market Risk 0.459*** 0.460*** 0.461*** 0.460***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tier-1 Supplier Risk 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Financial and Operational controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,848 25,848 25,848 25,848
Number of Firms 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277
R-squared 0.7152 0.7150 0.7150 0.7150
Notes. Robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are shown in parenthesis. All the covariates are included with log transformation. The overall R-squared value
is reported in all columns. To simplify the table, we do not report on controls. *** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
Results in column (b) to (d) demonstrate that the effects are consistent across semiconductor
tier-2 suppliers and non-semiconductor tier-2 suppliers. The risks of both types of suppliers, when
heavily shared, have a strong positive association with tier-0 firm risk. The estimates are also
consistent with the original estimates without distinguishing semiconductor tier-2 suppliers.
7. Conclusion
Our results provide the first empirical evidence on how the sub-tier network structure affects the
total equity risk of a firm. We construct the supply network of the high-tech sector using a new
global supplier dataset from Bloomberg. Compared to commonly used supplier-customer relation-
ship databases, this database substantively expands the coverage of suppliers of both domestic
and international suppliers. It gives us greater visibility into the multi-tiered supply network, and
hence allows us to test the impact of sub-tier network structure on firm risk.
Based on the constructed supply network, we find that overlapping in tier-2 suppliers is prevalent
in the high-tech sector. On average, 20 percent of tier-2 suppliers are shared by two or more
tier-1 suppliers and 2.3 percent of tier-2 suppliers are shared by at least five tier-1 suppliers.
Such a network feature has an important implication for risk aggregation in supply networks. We
find a strong positive association between shared tier-2 supplier risk and tier-0 firm’s risk. The
association increases when tier-2 suppliers are shared by more tier-1 suppliers. We propose two
network measures of tier-2 commonality, the diamond ratio and cosine commonality score, to isolate
the impact of a risky supply network from risky suppliers. We find that one standard deviation
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increase in the diamond ratio (cosine commonality score) leads to 0.58 (0.41) standard deviation
increase in the tier-0 firm’s risk. Given that both tier-0 firm and tier-1 suppliers have very limited
knowledge of tier-2 commonality and hence are unlikely to take actions in response, we are able to
identify the causal effect of tier-2 commonality on tier-0 firm risk.
Our study highlights the need for firms to increase visibility into their sub-tier supply network
because of substantial unseen and unmanaged supply chain risks they impose. In particular, firms
should identify critical sub-tier suppliers that are shared by multiple immediate suppliers and
proactively manage the associated risks. The metrics of sub-tier commonality proposed in this paper
can also be applied to other industries to study the prevalence and impact of sub-tier commonality
and to assess consequent risks.
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Appendix. Tables
Table A1 Coverage bias
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 0/1 Indicator (a) (b)
Probit Model No Supplier Less than Five
Reported (0) Suppliers Reported (0)
Market Capitalization 0.052*** 0.163***
(0.003) (0.004)
United States -0.191*** 0.011
(0.030) (0.031)
Japan 0.036 -0.184***
(0.030) (0.031)
Korea -0.356*** -0.628***
(0.033) (0.042)
Mainland China -0.263*** -0.593***
(0.034) (0.041)
Taiwan 0.402*** 0.137***
(0.031) (0.031)
Household Durables (252010) 0.172*** 0.293***
(0.045) (0.042)
Internet Software & Services (451010) -0.242*** -0.374***
(0.047) (0.058)
IT Services (451020) 0.036 -0.223***
(0.034) (0.040)
Software (451030) -0.315*** -0.484***
(0.032) (0.040)
Communications Equipment (452010) 0.116*** -0.080**
(0.035) (0.037)
Computers & Peripherals (452020) 0.327*** 0.475***
(0.040) (0.033)
Electronic Equipment, Instruments & Components 0.032 0.146***
(452030) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 0.682*** -1.589***
(0.030) (0.036)
Observations 28,260 28,260
R-squared 0.0433 0.1289
Notes. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Covariate market capitalization is included with log transformation. 
Pseudo R-squared value is reported in all columns.  *** --- 0.01 level, **--- 0.05 level and *--- 0.1 level.
